The ethics of memory modification : personal narratives, relational selves and autonomy

For nearly two decades, ethicists have expressed concerns that the further development and use of memory modification technologies (MMTs) - techniques allowing to intentionally and selectively alter memories - may threaten the very foundations of who we are, our personal identity, and thus pose a threat to our well-being, or even undermine our "humaneness". This paper examines the potential ramifications of memory-modifying interventions such as changing the valence of targeted memories and selective deactivation of a particular memory as these interventions appear to be at the same time potentially both most promising clinically as well as menacing to identity. However, unlike previous works discussing the potential consequences of MMTs, this article analyzes them in the context of the narrative relational approach to personal identity and potential issues related to autonomy. I argue that such a perspective brings to light the ethical aspects and moral issues arising from the use of MMTs that have been hidden from previously adopted approaches. In particular, this perspective demonstrates how important the social context in which an individual lives is for the ethical evaluation of a given memory-modifying intervention. I conclude by suggesting that undertaking memory modifications without taking into account the social dimension of a person’s life creates the risk that she will not be able to meet one of the basic human needs - the autonomous construction and maintenance of personal identity. Based on this conclusion, I offer some reflections on the permissibility and advisability of MMTs and what these considerations suggest for the future

The Ethics of Memory Modification: Personal Narratives, Relational Selves and Autonomy

For nearly two decades, ethicists have expressed concerns that the further development and use of memory modification technologies (MMTs)—techniques allowing to intentionally and selectively alter memories—may threaten the very foundations of who we are, our personal identity, and thus pose a threat to our well-being, or even undermine our “humaneness.” This paper examines the potential ramifications of memory-modifying interventions such as changing the valence of targeted memories and selective deactivation of a particular memory as these interventions appear to be at the same time potentially both most promising clinically as well as menacing to identity. However, unlike previous works discussing the potential consequences of MMTs, this article analyzes them in the context of the narrative relational approach to personal identity and potential issues related to autonomy. I argue that such a perspective brings to light the ethical aspects and moral issues arising from the use of MMTs that have been hidden from previously adopted approaches. In particular, this perspective demonstrates how important the social context in which an individual lives is for the ethical evaluation of a given memory-modifying intervention. I conclude by suggesting that undertaking memory modifications without taking into account the social dimension of a person’s life creates the risk that she will not be able to meet one of the basic human needs—the autonomous construction and maintenance of personal identity. Based on this conclusion, I offer some reflections on the permissibility and advisability of MMTs and what these considerations suggest for the future

Philosophical, ethical and sociali implications of brain-to-computer and brain-to-brain interfaces

Etyczno-społeczne implikacje płynące z badań nad interfejsami mózg-komputer i mózg–mózg stanowią dziś wyzwanie dla filozofów i etyków. Niosą ze sobą potencjał przekształcenia społeczeństwa w różnych obszarach jego funkcjonowania. Z jednej strony dają nowe możliwości terapeutyczne, perspektywy usprawnienia komunikacji międzyludzkiej lub nawet stworzenia nowych form międzygatunkowego porozumiewania się. Jednak z drugiej strony stanowią fundamentalne zagrożenie dla wolności myśli jednostki i poczucia jej autonomii. Autor prezentuje w artykule możliwości interfejsów poprzez przegląd związanych z nimi przełomowych eksperymentów. Zarysowane tło eksperymentalne i teoretyczne będzie stanowić podstawę głównego celu pracy, czyli refleksji nad kluczowymi filozoficznymi dylematami, jakie stawiają rozwój i szeroka aplikacja wspomnianej technologii.Socio-ethical implications that emerged from brain-computer and brain-to-brain interfaces research exemplify one of the greatest challenges for contemporary philosophers and ethics. This advanced technology may exert extensive influences on many areas of human life. Its therapeutic potential and improvement of interpersonal or even interspecies communication will be widely applied in the future. On the other hand, interfaces may pose a fundamental danger for human freedom and autonomy. In this article, the presentation of interfaces technology and their future potential will be provided. This outline, will lead to a major aim of the article, namely a reflection on the philosophical dilemma of a key importance

Dimensions of the Threat to the Self Posed by Deep Brain Stimulation: Personal Identity, Authenticity, and Autonomy

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is an invasive therapeutic method involving the implantation of electrodes and the electrical stimulation of specific areas of the brain to modulate their activity. DBS brings therapeutic benefits, but can also have adverse side effects. Recently, neuroethicists have recognized that DBS poses a threat to the very fabric of human existence, namely, to the selves of patients. This article provides a review of the neuroethical literature examining this issue, and identifies the crucial dimensions related to the self which DBS may endanger—personal identity, authenticity, and autonomy. The most influential theories accounting for these dimensions are analyzed herein, and it is argued that most of these theories require further refinement. This paper also demonstrates the interrelation between personal identity, authenticity, and autonomy, and concludes that one can only fully understand the impact of DBS on the self when all of these factors are taken into account

To remember, or not to remember? Potential impact of memory modification on narrative identity, personal agency, mental health, and well-being

Memory modification technologies (MMTs)—interventions within the memory affecting its functions and contents in specific ways—raise great therapeutic hopes but also great fears. Ethicists have expressed concerns that developing and using MMTs may endanger the very fabric of who we are—our personal identity. This threat has been mainly considered in relation to two interrelated concerns: truthfulness and narrative self‐constitution. In this article, we propose that although this perspective brings up important matters concerning the potential aftermaths of MMT utilization, it fails to tell the whole story. We suggest that capturing more tangible potential consequences of MMT use, namely, its psychological ramifications is crucial both inethical considerations and in making decisions regarding the permissibility of such interventions. To this end, we first examine what current MMTs are capable of and what are the prospects of emerging MMTs. Subsequently, we outline the relationship between memory and personal identity; specifically, we indicate that concepts of self‐defining memories and narrative identity are crucial to considering how MMTs may influence one's psychological functioning. On this basis, we analyze potential consequences of narrative disruption that may be the result of the use of MMTs; more precisely, we consider its potential effects on mental health, well‐being, and personal agency, and outline the ethical dilemmas that decision‐makers face in this context. We conclude by considering the broader cultural context that may have influence on policymaking regarding permissibility of memory modification interventions

Cognitive status of thought experiments : Platonism, empiricism, mental models and analogy

The paper begins with a characterization of thought experiments, followed by a general outline of contemporary debates in the field. The discussion reveals that the most significant controversy involved is the dispute over the epistemic status of thought experiments between empiricists, Platonists, and the proponents of mental models. After a critical analysis of these approaches, a new theoretical framework proposed by Paul Bartha is introduced. It is suggested that Bartha’s approach, which appeals to a theory of analogy, offers new insights into the structure of thought experiments. The paper concludes with general remarks on the state of the art in the field

Poznawczy status eksperymentów myślowych. Platonizm, empiryzm, modele mentalne i analogia

The paper begins with a characterization of thought experiments, followed by a general outline of contemporary debates in the field. The discussion reveals that the most significant controversyinvolved is the dispute over the epistemic status of thought experiments between empiricists, Platonists, and the proponents of mental models. After a critical analysis of these approaches, a new theoretical framework proposed by Paul Bartha is introduced. It is suggested that Bartha’s approach, which appeals to a theory of analogy, offers new insights into the structure of thought experiments. The paper concludes with general remarks on the state of the art in the field

Pattern theory of self and situating moral aspects: the need to include authenticity, autonomy and responsibility in understanding the effects of deep brain stimulation

The aims of this paper are to: (1) identify the best framework for comprehending multidimensional impact of deep brain stimulation (DBS) on the self; (2) identify weaknesses of this framework; (3) propose refinements to it; (4) in pursuing (3), show why and how this framework should be extended with additional moral aspects and demonstrate their interrelations; (5) define how moral aspects relate to the framework; (6) show the potential consequences of including moral aspects on evaluating DBS’s impact on patients’ selves. Regarding (1), I argue that the pattern theory of self (PTS) can be regarded as such a framework. In realizing (2) and (3), I indicate that most relevant issues concerning PTS that require resolutions are ontological issues, including the persistence question, the "specificity problem", and finding lacking relevant aspects of the self. In realizing (4), I identify aspects of the self not included in PTS which are desperately needed to investigate the full range of potentially relevant DBS-induced changes-authenticity, autonomy, and responsibility, and conclude that how we define authenticity will have implications for our concept of autonomy, which in turn will determine how we think about responsibility. Concerning (5), I discuss a complex relation between moral aspects and PTS-on one hand, they serve as the lens through which a particular self-pattern can be evaluated; on the other, they are, themselves, products of dynamical interactions of various self-aspects. Finally, I discuss (6), demonstrating novel way of understanding the effects of DBS on patients’ selves